Procyclicality and the new Basel Accord–banks’ choice of loan rating system by Catarineu-Rabell, Eva et al.
Procyclicality and the new Basel Accord–
banks’ choice of loan rating system
Eva Catarineu-Rabell
Patricia Jackson
and
Dimitrios P Tsomocos
Working Paper no. 181
E-mail:  eva.catarineu@econ.upf.es;  p.jackson@bankofengland.co.uk;
dimitrios.tsomocos@bankofengland.co.uk
The authors are grateful to Pamela Nickell for carrying out some of the calculations and Nicola
Anderson, Charles Goodhart, Andy Haldane, Glenn Hoggarth, Nobu Kiyotaki, William Klein,
Alistair Milne, William Perraudin, Hyun Shin, Paul Tucker and seminar participants at the Bank
of England XI European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, INSEAD, LSE, the University of Oxford and two anonymous referees for helpful
comments and remarks. However, all remaining errors are ours. The views expressed here are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or the FMG of
the LSE or the University of Pompeu Fabra.
Copies of working papers may be obtained from Publications Group, Bank of England,
Threadneedle Street, London, EC2R 8AH;  telephone 020 7601 4030, fax 020 7601 3298, e-mail
mapublications@bankofengland.co.uk
Working papers are also available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/wp/index.html
The Bank of England’s working paper series is externally refereed.
© Bank of England 2003
ISSN 1368-5562
3Contents
Abstract 5
Summary 7
1 Introduction 9
2 Procyclicality and the new Basel Accord 10
3 Basel Accord 12
4 Bank ratings 15
5 The preferred rating approach for a bank 23
6 Forward-looking ratings 38
7 Conclusion 38
References 40
Annex 1: Transition matrices 43
Annex 2: Endowments (monetary and commodities) for the three
sectors of the economy
47
Annex 3: Optimisation problems for each agent 48
Annex 4: Market clearing conditions of the existing six markets 50
Annex 5: Best performing regulatory policy under different policy
objectives
51
5Abstract
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is proposing to introduce, in 2006, new risk-based
requirements for internationally active (and other significant) banks. These will replace the
relatively risk-invariant requirements in the current Accord. This article examines the
implications of this new risk-based regime for procyclicality of minimum capital requirements –
in particular whether the choice of particular loan rating system by the banks would significantly
increase the likelihood of sharp increases in capital requirements in recessions, creating the
potential for classic credit crunches. The paper finds that rating schemes that are designed to be
more stable over the cycle, akin to those of the external rating agencies, would not increase
procyclicality, but ratings that are conditioned on the current point in the cycle, akin in some
respects to a Merton approach, could substantially increase procyclicality. This makes the
question of which rating schemes banks will use very important. The paper uses a general
equilibrium model of the financial system to explore whether banks would choose to use a
countercyclical, procyclical or neutral rating scheme. The results indicate that banks would not
choose a stable rating approach, which has important policy implications for the design of the
Accord. It makes it important that banks are given incentives to adopt more stable rating
schemes. This consideration has been reflected in the Committee’s latest proposals, in
October 2002.
7Summary
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is proposing to introduce, in 2006, new risk-based
requirements for internationally active (and other significant) banks. Under this regime capital
requirements for many banks will be based on their own assessments of the probability of default
of individual borrowers. These will replace the relatively risk-invariant requirements in the
current Accord which are based on the broad type of lending. This paper examines the
implications of this new risk-based regime for the cyclicality of capital requirements – in
particular whether the choice of particular loan rating systems by the banks would make sharp
increases in capital requirements in recessions more likely. This is an important policy question
because substantial changes in capital requirements would increase the likelihood of ‘credit
crunches’.
All regimes with minimum capital requirements have the potential to generate procyclical effects
because capital available to meet the requirements becomes more scarce in recessions as banks
make provisions and write off defaulted loans. The new element under the proposed revised
Basel Accord is the potential for capital requirements on non-defaulted assets to rise in recessions
if banks downgrade loans. The paper finds that the extent of this additional procyclicality
depends on the nature of the rating systems used by the banks.
A number of banks have carried out careful mapping exercises to ensure that their rating
approaches are very close to those of the main rating agencies which are designed to be relatively
stable over the cycle. Many other banks have adopted an approach based on a Merton-type model
which uses information on the current share price and liabilities. Because this approach uses
current liabilities, it is in some respects akin to a rating that is conditioned on the point in the
cycle. We estimate the likely increase in capital requirements in a recession, depending on
whether a bank is using one or other of these two rating approaches. Portfolios of corporate
exposures are constructed using information on the actual quality distribution of corporate loans
made by some large banks. The extent to which banks would downgrade loans in their rating
bands in a recession is estimated using transition matrices (for 1990-92) calculated from Moody’s
ratings and from ratings produced by a Merton-type model. We find that ratings based on
Moody’s approach lead to little, if any, increase in capital requirements for non-defaulted assets,
whereas ratings based on a Merton-type model lead to a 40% to 50% increase.
This makes the question of which rating schemes banks will use very important. We use a general
equilibrium model of the financial system to explore whether banks would choose to use a
8countercyclical, procyclical or neutral rating scheme. The model consists of three sectors (the
household, corporate and banking sectors), two time periods with two possible future scenarios,
and a financial market with one default-free asset and loans. Default is endogenous in the model.
Capital requirements depend on the credit rating set by the bank, which is in turn based on the
expected default rate of corporates. Expected default is also the key variable that affects the
banks’ decisions on how to allocate their portfolios between loans and other assets. This affects
credit expansion in the economy. Demand for loans depends on the default rate and supply of
loans on the bank rating and capital weight.
The results indicate that banks would not choose a stable rating approach. Bank profits would be
higher if they adopted a system that produced ratings that varied over the economic cycle,
because such a system would enable them to transfer the cost of recessions to the rest of the
economy. Procyclical ratings could have macroeconomic consequences by encouraging
overlending relative to risk in booms and reduction in lending in recessions. This underlines the
need for banks to be given incentives to adopt more stable rating regimes to underpin their capital
requirements. This consideration has been reflected in the current design of the Accord.
91    Introduction
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is currently revising the minimum capital
standards for internationally active banks to introduce capital requirements which more closely
reflect the risks. This offers economic benefits in reducing the possible distortions to the way that
banking activity is conducted which can flow from risk-insensitive requirements. However, one
unavoidable consequence of more risk-based requirements is that they could vary over the cycle,
which could increase the likelihood that banks run-up against constraints on their lending in
recessions.
It is important to understand the extent of likely variation in capital requirements and also
whether bank behaviour is likely to modify or exacerbate the effect. This paper explores these
issues, in particular whether the choice of internal rating system by the banks will influence
cyclicality of capital requirements and what the banks’ preference regarding rating systems might
be.
The new Accord is currently being designed and there is a live policy debate over whether
different rating approaches would lead to different procyclical outcomes and if they did which
approach banks would choose to adopt. This paper indicates that the new risk weight curves
proposed by the Committee in October 2002 reduce the cyclical effect but less forward-looking
rating systems operated by the banks, which do not take into account possible changes in
economic climate, could still lead to a substantial increase in capital requirements in recessions.
Looking at the 1990-92 recession, corporate ratings based on Moody’s approach lead to little
increase in capital requirements whereas ratings based on a Merton-type model lead to a 40% to
50% increase. Bank ratings which are not forward looking, and therefore do not take full account
of risks taken in booms, could also exacerbate the economic cycle by encouraging overlending in
booms.
The paper uses a general equilibrium model to assess the costs/benefits for the banks of pursuing
different approaches to setting ratings and therefore whether they would voluntarily choose to
adopt a forward-looking approach which would give more stable ratings over the cycle. A
simplified version of Tsomocos (2003) is used. The model includes heterogeneity of economic
agents and endogenous default. By introducing capital charges (in the form of risk weights) for
bank assets, which depend on the rating assigned by the bank which in turn depends on
probability of default, we are able to assess the effect on bank profitability and welfare of the
choice of different rating approaches.
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Section 2 examines the issues of procyclical capital requirements. Section 3 sets out the
background on the proposed new Basel Accord, Section 4 examines the effect of the new
approach on bank capital requirements over the cycle, depending on the rating approach chosen
by the banks. Section 5 examines which rating approach would be preferred by the banks. Section
6 considers the forward-looking approach to ratings. Section 7 sets out the conclusion.
2    Procylicality and the new Basel Accord
A long-standing concern with regard to the setting of minimum prudential capital requirements
for banks is that pressure on bank capital in a recession could lead to cutbacks in bank lending in
stress periods with a constraint of this kind. The introduction of the Basel Accord in 1988,
marked a worldwide adoption of minimum capital requirements that had to be met at all times. A
number of academic studies were carried out after the recession in the early 1990s to see if the
minimum standards had indeed created procyclical effects on lending. It would not be surprising
if the introduction of capital requirements had some effect on lending, through encouraging banks
to focus on the true cost of some of the riskier loans. But the concern was that fixed capital
requirements could have significantly exacerbated the 1990 recession by creating a credit crunch
and this was the focus of a number of academic papers. This literature is surveyed in a study
carried out by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Jackson et al (1999)) and the
conclusion for the United States was that particular sectors such as real estate or small businesses
may have been affected by pressure on bank capital in some regions (Hancock and Wilcox
(1997), Hancock and Wilcox (1998) and Peek and Rosengren (1997a, 1997b)). But there was no
evidence of widespread problems across the United States nor any clear-cut evidence for other
countries.
The effect of the current Accord on economic cycles is likely to be muted because earnings are
the first buffer against the need to raise provisions or write off loans, limiting the impact of
recessions on bank capital and therefore the likelihood of credit crunches. Also, modest falls in
capital may be covered by increased use of subordinated debt which is included in Tier 2 capital,
because many banks carry a greater proportion of capital (than required) as Tier 1, giving them
headroom to increase Tier 2. The new Accord which will be introduced in 2006 could, however,
have a profound effect on the dynamics of bank minimum capital and lending in recessions. In
contrast to the current Accord where, for a given quantum of lending to a particular set of
borrowers, the capital requirement is invariant over time, under the new Accord the capital
requirements will depend on the current risk assessments of those borrowers. If borrowers are
downgraded in a recession, then the capital requirements faced by the bank will rise. This would
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be in addition to the possible reduction in the bank’s capital because of write-offs and specific
provisions.
There are a number of aspects to the procyclicality debate. One is the extent of likely fluctuations
in bank capital requirements over the cycle and whether any increase in requirements in
recessions could be met by the banks – or whether capital requirements are likely to bind at that
point requiring an adjustment to lending. A further aspect is whether, if the ability of banks to
lend is restricted in recessions, other sources of funds would substitute for any shortfall, limiting
the overall effect on the corporate and retail sectors. This paper examines the first set of issues –
the likely extent of variation in bank capital requirements over the cycle, for different profiles of
bank portfolio, under Basel II and whether any increase could be met given current capitalisation
of the banks. This was also discussed in Jackson (2001), and Ervin and Wilde (2001). Allen and
Saunders (2002) stress that other elements of the capital calculation for some banks (eg LGD for
advanced approach banks) will also be subject to cyclical variation.
Under Basel II the minimum capital requirements of most large banks will be set with reference
to each bank’s internal assessment of the riskiness of the borrower. Borrowers will be assigned to
rating bands tied to a probability of default. The extent to which banks need to downgrade
borrowers in a recession will depend on the way in which the probability of default is assessed. If
borrowers are assigned to a rating under the assumption that economic conditions prevailing
when the loan was made were likely to remain unchanged over the life of a loan, then there
would be substantial downgrading if economic conditions deteriorated (and vice versa if
conditions improved). In contrast, if banks, when assessing the credit-worthiness of the borrower,
consider the effect of a change in the economic climate, then downgrades might be rather less.
Another effect of rating borrowers in booms using an assumption that buoyant economic
conditions will continue could be over lending. Risks are taken in booms and the effect is felt
when the economy turns down. If banks underestimate the longer-term risks of exposures this
could exacerbate bubble conditions. This is also an issue raised in Danielsson et al (2001).
A possible explanation for underestimation of risks in booms is set out in Herring (1999). As
memories of the last economic downturn fade, banks let their capital positions decline and lend
on easier terms. They suffer from ‘disaster myopia’. ‘At some point, long after the occurrence of
a disaster, the subjective probability of the recurrence of disaster may become so low that it is
treated as zero’. As the probability is revised down so the bank will be able to lend to a broader
range of creditors. It would also affect pricing of credit. To the extent that salaries and bonuses
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reflect short-term profit (and do not reflect the longer-term risks) so lending officers will have an
incentive to disregard dangers. Once a shock occurs, subjective probabilities are revised upwards
and the financial system may descend into crisis. It is also consistent with the theory of why bank
credit policies fluctuate in Rajan (1994). Bank management is assumed to be rational but has
short-term concerns – focusing on the bank’s earnings and reputation. The bank management can
achieve their goals with a liberal credit policy in booms, boosting current earnings at the expense
of future earnings. The considerations that might lead banks to adopt ratings that lead capital
requirements to fluctuate over the cycle are explored further in Section 5.
3    Basel Accord
The Basel Accord sets the minimum capital requirements for most significant banks worldwide.
The current Accord, agreed in 1988, is based on only a limited differentiation of risk using broad
categories of exposure – with an 8% charge for all exposures except OECD government, OECD
interbank, under one-year non-OECD interbank and residential mortgages. The requirements
reflect the type of loan and not the riskiness of the loan (except for the OECD/non-OECD
distinction and recognition of some types of financial collateral) and therefore will not change if
the creditworthiness of borrowers deteriorates.
In contrast, the new Accord on which the Committee is currently working will differentiate
exposures according to the riskiness of the borrower. Capital requirements will therefore rise if
the creditworthiness of borrowers deteriorates. The new Accord will offer two approaches
(standardised and internal ratings based) for the setting of risk-based capital requirements. Under
a standardised approach, banks will allocate borrowers to bands according to the external rating
of the borrower (for example, from a rating agency) – see below.
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Table 1: Standardised approach - percentage capital charges according to external rating of
the borrower
AAA to AA- A+ to A-
BBB+ to
BBB-
BB+ to BB-
B+ to B- Below B- Unrated
Sovereigns 0 1.6 4.0 8.0 8.0 12.0 8.0
Banks
Option 2*
< 3 months
> 3 months
1.6
1.6
1.6
4.0
1.6
4.0
4.0
8.0
4.0
8.0
12
12
1.6
4.0
Corporates 1.6 4.0 8.0 8.0 12.0 12.0 8.0
(*There is also an option which uses the rating of the sovereign to rate banks)
Under an alternative, internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, banks will allocate borrowers to
probability of default bands. The Committee has set out a function for calculating the capital
requirement for each loan based on the probability of default (PD) of the borrower (set by the
bank) and the loss given default (LGD) which would be experienced were the borrower to fail.
Under the foundation (IRB) approach the Committee would set the loss given default, and under
an advanced approach the bank would set it. The capital requirements were calculated by the
Committee, using credit risk models, for losses over a one-year horizon with a 99.5% confidence
level. It was assumed that the correlation between the returns on different corporate exposures
was 20%. This was based on information on correlations used by the industry and also research
carried out by the Committee on correlations implicit in economic capital allowed by firms.
There was also an add-on to cover measurement error (the models tend to underestimate the tail
events (see Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2001))) and the low loss absorbing capacity of Tier 2
capital because of the inclusion of subordinated debt. The banks’ economic capital models
assume that equity will be used to ensure a target solvency level is attained. In contrast, under the
Basel Accord up to half the requirement can be met with subordinated debt. The following
risk-weight function, based on this, was put forward for the corporate portfolio in the second
consultation paper issued by the Committee. See Basel Committee (2001).
Benchmark risk weight = 976.5 x N (1.118 x G (PD) +1.288)x(1 + .0470 x (1 – PD) / PD 0.44).
Here, N(.) denotes the standard cumulative normal distribution and G(.) is the inverse of this.
PD is the one-year default rate.
As described in detail by Gordy (2000), the formula is derived from a restricted version of the
CreditMetrics model. Under this risk-weight function the capital requirement for an unsecured
exposure rises steeply as the probability of default increases.
14
Under the treatment for retail set out in the second consultative paper, the risk weights proposed
were 50% of those put forward for corporates for a given PD, and banks could set their own
LGD – average LGDs for non-mortgage retail are around 85% and those for mortgage retail are
around 25%.
Since the release of the consultation paper (CP2) the Committee has been carrying out further
work to assess the appropriate corporate and retail curves – the corporate weighting function has
been adjusted to take into account the fact that small and medium enterprise (SME) exposures
account for a heavy proportion of the loans at higher PDs. These exposures have greater
idiosyncratic risk which reduces the correlation for loans in the higher PD bands (see Lopez
(2002)). The Committee also focused on the need to flatten the curves somewhat because of
concerns about procyclicality. The Committee is now considering setting correlation as a
declining function of PD from 24% to 12%, using the following formula.
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For the smaller corporates there is a further downward adjustment to correlation.  See Basel
Committee (2002) and a summary in Jackson (2002).
The Committee has calibrated the capital requirements using a 99.9% confidence level rather than
99.5% plus an add-on used for the CP2 version, which also helps to deliver a flatter curve. This
still gives a solvency level equivalent to a low investment grade rating because part of the capital
held to deliver it is subordinated debt not equity – which was one of the reasons for the add-on on
the CP2 proposals.
Following research on retail, the Committee has also set correlation for non-mortgage retail as a
declining function of the PD – declining from 17% to 2%. Revolving retail such as credit card
debt will be able to benefit from an even lower curve than non-mortgage retail. In contrast, for
mortgages a fixed correlation of 15% is thought appropriate because of the large cyclical
influence on mortgage losses and longer maturity.
The charts below show the main corporate and retail curves set out in the October 2002 QIS 3
technical document and the earlier curves proposed in CP2.
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Chart 1a:  Capital charges for corporate
and SME exposures (LGD 45%)
Chart 1b: Capital charges for mortgages
(LGD 25%)
Chart 1c: Capital charges for other retail
(LGD 85%)
The risk weight curves proposed by the Committee are based on credit modelling research and
statistics provided by the banks.  They have been designed to map more closely the capital
required to the riskiness of individual loans.  The proposed curves will reduce the distortions
created by the current Accord where a flat 8% requirement for most private sector loans
encourages banks to securitise their high quality loans, effectively increasing the risks carried for
a given capital level (see Jones (2000)).
4    Bank ratings
Given the reliance on internal probability of default ratings under the IRB approach, an important
question is the extent to which the rating approach chosen would affect the degree of
procyclicality in the capital requirements.  There is very little information available on the
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variation in internal bank ratings assigned to different borrowers over the cycle.  One paper
(Carling et al (2001)) examines ratings assigned by a Swedish bank to a group of borrowers over
the period 1994 to 2000 and shows that they are not stable over time – there is considerable
movement peak to trough. Segoviano and Lowe (2002) looking at Mexican bank ratings also find
substantial swings.
Although there is little direct evidence on bank internal ratings there is evidence from other
sources.  Some banks have chosen to adopt rating systems which are modelled on the approach
taken by the rating agencies, which is designed to give less variability in ratings if economic
conditions change. Indeed, a number of banks have carried out careful mapping exercises to
ensure that their rating approaches are very close to those of the main rating agencies. The
approach taken to the economic climate is clearly set out in the following comment by Standard
& Poor’s: ‘Standard & Poor’s credit ratings are meant to be forward looking; that is, their time
horizon extends as far as is analytically foreseeable. Accordingly, the anticipated ups and down
of business cycles – whether industry-specific or related to the general economy – should be
factored into the credit rating all along’.(1)
The similarity in approach between some banks’ internal ratings systems and the approach used
by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s means that evidence on the volatility of the rating agency
ratings is indicative of the volatility which would be seen in some banks’ internal ratings.
Many other banks have adopted an approach based on KMV which uses the current equity price
of the borrower and current information on the borrower’s liabilities to calculate a Merton default
likelihood. Because these estimates use current liabilities of the borrower they may well show
more variability as economic conditions change – with riskiness apparently increasing in the later
stages of a boom (when indebtedness traditionally increases) and the subsequent downturn.
A paper published by KMV (Uses and Abuses of Bank Default rates, March 1998) shows that
KMV ratings are considerably more volatile than those from Standard & Poor’s. The paper
compares a KMV one-year transition matrix (which shows the various probabilities that a
borrower starting the year in one rating band will end the year in that band or another band) with
a Standard & Poor’s transition matrix.  They find that with the rating agency matrix there is
around a 90% probability of remaining in a grade for a year which is around twice the probability
______________________________________________________________________________
(1)www.standardandpoors.com, Standard & Poor’s 2002 Corporate Ratings Criteria, 29 October 2002.
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in the KMV transition matrix – see Annex 1.  The transition matrices are shown in Tables A and
B in Annex 1.
There are therefore at least two industry standard rating methods used by the banks which may
lead to a different amount of variability in ratings in a recession. This paper explores the likely
changes in capital requirements (for different quality profiles of portfolio) in a recession
according to which of these industry standard approaches to rating is used. There are other rating
approaches which are used by banks but there is little information on these.
The question of the relative cyclicality of capital requirements based on (1) internal rating using a
rating industry approach or (2) a Merton-type model, is explored by taking the profiles of loan
books across different PD bands seen for banks in different countries and for the G10 as a whole,
and applying recession ratings-transition matrices to produce a stressed quality distribution. The
change in the capital requirements under the new Basel Accord can then be calculated from the
two quality distributions.
Information is available on the quality distribution of banks’ corporate loan books from various
sources. The Federal Reserve Board carried out a survey of the distribution of loans by rating
band for a number of US banks, reported in Gordy (2000). The average and high quality
distributions are shown below. A few banks publish ratings distributions – the distribution for
Deutsche is shown in the table under high quality European.
In November 2001, the Basel Committee put on the BIS web site the results of a quantitative
impact study, looking at the effect that the new Basel Accord proposals would have on the
minimum capital requirements of a sample of large internationally active G10 banks. The study
includes weighted(2) average information on the quality distributions of corporate, interbank and
sovereign portfolios held by these banks. For corporate exposures 36% are in AAA, AA and A,
30% in BBB and 34% below BBB. This has been used to estimate an allocation across the finer
bands used in the FRB survey which is included in Table 2.
______________________________________________________________________________
(2) The results have been weighted inside countries by the capital of the banks and between countries by the relative
importance of the international banking sector.
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Table 2:  Portfolio distributions of credit quality for corporate exposures
Average quality –
US (%)
High quality–
US (%)
High quality –
European (%)
G10
Estimated
AAA 3 4 - 4
AA 5 6 32 6
A 13 29 19 27
BBB 29 36 26 30
BB 35 21 18 29
B 12 3 4 4
CCC 3 1 1 1
All these quality distributions, with the exception of that for the G10, which includes Japan, relate
to a period of strong economic growth.
In order to estimate how these quality distributions would change in an adverse economic
climate, we have stressed them using the one-year ratings transition matrices (calculated from
Moody’s ratings) for business cycle troughs in the period 31.12.70 to 31.12.97 defined as the
years with growth in the lowest third (produced by Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2000)). They
calculated two stress transition matrices, one for US industrials and one for the universe of
Moody’s ratings. The US matrix has been used for the US portfolios, and the matrix for the
universe of ratings has been used for the other portfolios – the matrices used are shown in
Annex 1.
Moody’s ratings are not conditional on the point in the cycle but even so there are more
downgrades in a recession.  This reflects the uncertain impact of stress periods on different
borrowers/industries.
Applying these transition matrices, the quality distributions for the bank corporate portfolios set
out in Table 2 and the implied distribution for the G10 would change to the following:
Table 3: Stressed distributions – business cycle troughs
Average quality – US
(%)
High quality – US
(%)
High quality –
European (%)
G10
(%)
AAA 2.7 3.6 0.3 3.4
AA 5.0 6.3 28.9 6.1
A 14.0 29.2 22.5 27.1
BBB 27.9 34.4 24.8 29.3
BB 32.2 20.0 16.8 25.8
B 13.4 4.6 4.9 5.9
CCC 2.6 0.9 0.9 1.2
Defaulted 2.1 0.8 0.9 1.2
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Applying the Basel CP2 corporate risk weight curve and the flatter corporate risk weight curves
set out in the October 2002 QIS 3 technical guidance document, this change in the quality
distributions would give rise to the increases in capital requirements for the various portfolios set
out in Table 4. In all the capital calculations the loss given default is set at 50% (the Basel Accord
proposed LGD for unsecured corporate loans in CP2)(3) and defaulted assets are treated as having
a PD of 100%.
Table 4:  Percentage increase in capital requirements in a downturn
Average quality – US
(%)
High quality – US
(%)
High quality –
European
(%)
G10
(%)
CP2 14 16 14 16
October 2002 11 11 10 10
Note the transition matrix is based on low growth as well as recession years.  In order to look at a
recession period, a transition matrix has been calculated for the recession in the early 1990s.
Given that banks see a deterioration in their portfolios over several years in a recession and would
find it difficult to raise new capital in that economic climate, the transitions have been calculated
from Moody’s ratings (for a fixed group of 5,022 obligors) over the period December 1990 to
December 1992.  This transition matrix is shown in Table E in Annex 1.  The value in row i and
column j shows the probability that an obligor of rating i in December 1990 will have a rating j in
December 1992. Using this transition matrix the quality distribution would change to that shown
in Table 5.
______________________________________________________________________________
(3) This has now been reduced to 45% in the October 2002 QIS 3 technical document.
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Table 5: Stressed distributions – early 1990s transition matrix
Average quality –
US (%)
High quality –
US (%)
High quality –
European (%)
G10
(%)
AAA 2.5 3.3 0.2 3.0
AA 4.9 6.0 27.3 5.6
A 14.0 29.3 23.3 26.9
BBB 28.5 34.8 25.3 29.8
BB 32.2 20.2 17.1 26.2
B 12.0 4.2 4.6 5.6
CCC and below 2.0 0.7 0.7 0.9
Defaulted 3.9 1.5 1.5 2.0
The increase in capital requirements for the different portfolios which would result from the
change in the quality distribution is set out in Table 6.
Table 6
Average quality –
US (%)
High quality –
US (%)
High quality –
European (%) G10 (%)
CP2 20.7 21.1 20.2 21.6
October 2002 17.9 15.2 15.3 16.0
The CP2 requirements would therefore seem likely to lead to a significant increase in bank
capital requirements in recession periods. The flatter October 2002 curves would reduce the
effect but it would still be sizable.
Under the proposals in CP2, defaulted assets even where substantially provided against, could
give rise to large capital requirements. Once a loan has been fully written off it is, of course,
removed from the calculation of capital requirements. But while loans remain on a bank balance
sheet, even where partially provided against, they are subject to capital requirements reflecting
the borrower PD. For all defaulted assets a full requirement was required on the net of the loan
minus the specific provision assuming a PD of 1 even though, for a bank which had raised
substantial provisions against defaulted loans, little additional risk might remain. The Committee
is now considering allowing the requirement to be calculated on the gross amount of the loan.
The specific provision would offset the capital requirement. For an unsecured loan in the
foundation approach, where a 45% LGD is proposed, a 45% provision would completely offset
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the capital charge. This means that, for a bank which has provisions of at least 45% of the value
of the loans against defaulted assets, the extra capital charge in a recession, from the introduction
of the Basel risk-based requirements, would only come through the deterioration in the economic
value of non-defaulting loans rather than the increase in defaults. Provisioning on defaulted loans
is already giving rise to cyclical pressure on banks’ capital and is not therefore a new element
caused by the proposed Accord. However, in terms of the overall procyclical effect, the issue is
the combination of both elements.
Table 7 sets out the increased capital requirements on non-defaulted assets. Using the transition
matrix for Moody’s ratings over 1990 to 1992 to generate the changed quality distribution the
capital requirements. For the non-defaulted assets capital requirements would be largely
unchanged and indeed would be lower for some portfolios.
Table 7
Change in capital requirements for non-defaulted assets
Average quality –
US (%)
High quality –
US (%)
High quality –
European (%) G10 (%)
CP2 -7.6 1.2 -1.3 -0.7
October 2002 -7.0 -0.1 -1.5 -1.8
The reason for this result can be seen when the change in the quality distribution is examined.
The change in the percentage of the portfolio in each rating band for the high quality European
portfolio is set out in Table 8.
Table 8
High quality European portfolio -
change in the percentage in each band
AAA
AA
A
BBB
BB
B
CCC and below
Defaulted
+0.2
 -4.7
+4.3
 -0.7
 -0.9
+0.6
 -0.3
+1.5
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The changes in the lower quality bands have the dominant effect in terms of capital because of
the steepness of the risk weight curves and therefore the net decline in assets in BBB to CCC
(largely reflecting the move of assets into default) determines the overall fall in capital when
defaulted assets are excluded.
But a further issue is whether this muted effect would be the answer for the other industry
standard rating approach based on a Merton-type model. To look at this we calculated a transition
matrix for Merton PD’s for the period 1990 to 1992 for 282 borrowers (admittedly not a very
large sample). We calculated PDs for the individual borrowers using the Merton model for
December 1990 and then recalculated the PDs for the same borrowers for December 1992. The
PDs were fitted to the rating bands used in the Moody’s transitions to give a AAA, AA etc. rating
for each borrower.  These ‘ratings’ could then be used to calculate a Merton transitions matrix.
This matrix is shown in Table F in Annex 1. Using this matrix to adjust the quality distributions,
the capital requirements for the non-defaulted assets would change very substantially as set out in
Table 9.
Table 9
Average quality –
US (%)
High quality –
US (%)
High quality –
European (%) G10 (%)
CP2 18.0 84.1 70.5 59.2
October 2002 8.8 53.2 47.1 36.3
For high quality books the Merton ratings would give a very large increase in capital
requirements for the non-defaulted assets even after the flattening in the proposed risk weight
curves by the Committee. This is particularly the case for the higher quality portfolios. This new
procyclical element could therefore be very important for the banks using the IRB approach
under Basel II.
An important question is whether a bank could meet the increase in capital requirements that
might be seen in a recession were it using an approached akin to Merton. A 50% increase in the
4% Tier 1 ratio would bring the minimum to 6% and a 50% increase in the Tier 1 plus Tier 2
ratio would bring the minimum to 12%. 12% of large G10 banks could not meet the Tier 1
increase and 70% of large G10 banks could not meet the Tier 1 plus Tier 2 increase – see Charts
1 and 2 which show the actual capital ratios of G10 banks with Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital of more
than €3 billion (end 2001). Bank capitalisation varies but not substantially and these are therefore
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indicative of a longer period. Banks would, of course, in this period also be facing pressure on
their capital from the need to build up specific provisions to cover defaulted assets which would
make it even more difficult to meet the increase in capital requirements.
It will therefore be very important whether banks choose to adopt ratings which are more stable
over the cycle or whether some banks will continue to use ratings which are strongly procyclical.
If the latter were the case it might lead to the conclusion that the Committee should use standards
to limit or discourage the use of certain rating schemes or in some other way try to change the
banks’ incentives.
5    The preferred rating approach for a bank
Section 2 explored some reasons why banks might take an over optimistic view of risk (and
therefore ratings) in booms which could lead to volatility in ratings across the cycle. To look at
the question of whether a bank would prefer stable to volatile ratings we employ a simplified
version of the general equilibrium model set out in Tsomocos (2003) to estimate the effect on
bank profits of different approaches to ratings.
The closest methodological precursor to this model is the work of Martin Shubik (1999), who
introduced a central bank with exogenously specified stocks of money, and cash-in-advance
constraints in a strategic market game. Grandmont (1983) also introduced a banking sector into
general equilibrium with overlapping generations and he pointed out the inefficiency of trade
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with money. The commercial banking sector of this model follows closely Shubik and Tsomocos
(1992). The modelling of money and default in an incomplete markets framework is akin to the
models developed by Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) and Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik
(2000). None of the previous papers incorporates a competitive commercial banking sector, and
focuses on financial instability. Finally, default is modelled as in Shubik and Wilson (1977).
None of the models focus on loan rating and procyclicality.
5.1    The model
A multiperiod general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents has been used to study
multiple market interactions and the identification of various channels that are affected by
specific changes of policy parameters. A parameterised version of Tsomocos (2003) is used.  The
parameter values chosen are presented in Annexes 2 and 3 based on realistic figures for a large
economy. It enables the main effects on the optimising behaviour of the agents and market forces
to be considered. Heterogeneity permits us to conduct fully fledged welfare analysis.
A general equilibrium approach enables us to consider a richer institutional structure
incorporating market interactions. However, by increasing the dimensionality of the model
simplifications are made and some aspects that may be useful in analysing procyclicality are
sacrificed. For example, our model does not permit fully fledged dynamic analysis since it is only
a two-period model with complete markets. Second, the multitude of variables that characterise
the equilibrium of the model prevents us from providing analytical solutions. Finally, some of the
institutional assumptions may be considered ad hoc even though they are widely used in the
literature and reflect the workings of the economy. A partial equilibrium or game theoretic
analysis of the issues could certainly add insights and be complementary to the general
equilibrium methodology we adopt.
The model(4) consists of three sectors (the household, corporate and banking sectors), two time
periods with two possible future scenarios, and a financial market with one default-free asset and
loans. The corporate sector can be thought of as firms that both borrow from banks and sell
marketable financial assets. The banking sector raises funds by borrowing from the market and
______________________________________________________________________________
(4) Ideally, we should study a parameterisation with more than two periods to analyse the dynamics of moving from
one equilibrium to another and also incorporate the entire cycle into it. However, the dimensionality would increase
precipitously without leading to substantially different results. Our analysis depends primarily on the direction of the
economy, ie, recessionary or expansionary, that characterises a specific point in the cycle.
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taking deposits from the household sector. These funds are used to make loans to the corporate
sector and to buy marketable assets. Therefore, the financial structure of the economy is one of
complete markets with two assets (loans and default free assets) and two states of nature (good
and bad). Households and banks maximise consumption and profits respectively.
Without loss of generality, we consider a two-period parameterisation in which the second period
consists of two possible future economic scenarios (states) - a favourable and an unfavourable
one.  During the first period, agents engage themselves in the credit markets (ie interbank and
consumer loan markets) and subsequently trade in the asset and commodity markets.  In each
state in the second period, loans and deposits are settled, assets payoff and then commodity
trading occurs.  Finally, default settlement and consumption occurs.
Agent  represents the household sector that maximises consumption in all periods and future
states and borrows from the credit markets to achieve this. On the other hand, agent  – the
corporate sector, is assumed to care only about consumption in period zero and in the ‘bad’ state
(state 2) of period one. It represents a sector that only consumes when its investment in the asset
market does not generate a positive return; otherwise it reinvests its portfolio. Finally, the
banking sector, agent , maximises profits only in the second period. With this framework, we
capture the idea of a banking sector that, on average, maximises profits over the medium/long
horizon and avoids speculative behaviour in the short run. The endowments for each of the three
sectors are presented in Annex 2.
Uncertainty in the model comes from stochastic commodity and monetary endowments in the
two future scenarios and from stochastic asset payoffs. The private and capital endowments, as
well as the money supply in the economy, are also given. The optimisation problems and the
balance sheet of the banking sector are presented in Annex 3. Thus, equilibrium in our model is
defined as the solution to the three optimisation problems presented in Annex 3 plus the
satisfaction of the six market clearing conditions (prices of goods at t=0, s=1, s=2, interbank
market, loans market and asset market) that are presented in Annex 4.
Capital requirements of the banking sector are modelled as an extra constraint in the banks’
optimisation problem. In particular, it is assumed here that shareholders’ funds are fixed – banks
cannot raise extra capital. In other words, the numerator in the Capital Adequacy Ratio is
assumed to be constant. We want to focus on regimes where capital requirements are more likely
to be binding rather than those where some part of the problem may be alleviated by the capacity
to raise new capital. This is a reasonable assumption for periods of economic stress. Even in
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booms banks wishing to make a rights issue have to make a good business case to shareholders
making it difficult to raise extra capital simply to meet their capital requirements. Thus our aim is
to study the effects of changes in regulatory risk-weighted assets – ie the denominator in the risk
asset ratio.(5)
We now provide a formal description of the model.(6)
Let   1,0Tt time periods
  2,1Ss set of states 1t 
  ,Hh and  Bb set of economic sectors where
  household,   corporate and   banking
  1Ll set of commodities

he endowment of Hh  and be endowment  .
The utility functions of Hh are:
R:U 3h 
where ),,( 210
hhhhh xxxUU   and s'x  are consumptions in each state.
and the objective function of 
RU 3:
where state.each in  profits ingcorrespond  theare s' and ),,( 210 
 hhhUU 
We allow the banking sector to default on interbank loans and the corporate sector on commercial
loans.
Thus, the payoffs given bankruptcy penalties 21 L,L for the corporate and the banking sectors
respectively are:

 ss U
 s1
b
s
b
s DEBT,0maxLU 
______________________________________________________________________________
(5) Of course, if access to capital markets is uninhibited even in times of financial stress then dynamic capital
management may mitigate some of the adverse effects of banks’ choice of rating system.  However, since such
adjustments are more sluggish than risk-weights changes, it remains highly unlikely that the adverse effects would be
completely neutralised.
(6) The presentation of the general model, its properties and the proof of existence theorem are set out fully in
Tsomocos (2003). We present here the simplified version used for the simulations.
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  .Tt,Ss,DEBT,0maxLU s2ss 

The payoffs of the household and corporate sectors are functions of consumption,
),,( 210
hhhh xxxx  , whereas of the banking are functions of profits, ).,,( 210
hhh



There also exists one default-free asset (Arrow security),   .0,1A T
The optimisation problems with the corresponding budget sets, )(Bh  where
  ,,r,p,p,p 210 , of all the sectors are provided in Annex 3.
The capital requirements constraints are always binding and take the forms described in Sections
5.3-5.4.
We say that    ,,r,p,p,p;,, 210  (7) is a monetary equilibrium with commercial banks
and default (MECBD) for the economy if:
(a)
 
 hh
B
h
hh
maxArg 

(i)
(b)
 
 



 B
maxArg
(ii) All markets of Annex 4 clear.
5.2   Endogenous default
Default is endogenous in the model. The corporate sector take loans from the banks on which
they may default and invest in assets which are assumed to be default free. They will choose an
optimal default rate to maximise their utility. ( )( 21  nn  is the repayment rate (1- the default rate).
Likewise banks invest in the asset market, give loans and borrow from the central bank and they
choose an optimal default rate to maximise profits subject to a risk sensitive capital requirement.
The repayment rate, )( 21
 vv , is (1- the default rate). Households do not default – they only use
their initial monetary endowments to make deposits in the banks.
The capital requirements depend on the credit rating set by the bank which in turn is based on the
expected default rate of corporates. Expected default is also the key variable which affects the
banks’ decisions on how to allocate their portfolios between loans and other assets and the
interest rate to be charged on loans. This will affect credit expansion in the economy. Demand for
loans depends on the default rate and supply of loans on the bank rating and capital weight.
______________________________________________________________________________
(7) The choice variables and prices are defined in Annexes 3 and 4.
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The frequency of corporate sector defaults is used as a proxy for the business cycle with high
levels indicating recession periods.
5.3  Default varying risk weights
Under the proposed Accord, although regulators will set constant risk weights (ie capital
requirements) for all loans assessed to have the same probability of default (PD), the risk weight
of a particular loan will depend on the PD band into which a borrower is assigned by the bank.
This gives rise to the potential for capital requirements (ie risk weights) which vary across the
cycle.
In the model, the rating band to which corporate loans are assigned by the bank depends on the
endogenous corporate default rate. We examine the effects on bank profitability of three different
approaches to assigning ratings which in turn affect the minimum capital requirements or risk
weights.
(1) PD ratings which vary positively with expected corporate sector default;
(2) PD ratings which vary negatively with expected corporate sector default;
(3) PD ratings which do not vary.
In (1), banks would reassign loans to a higher PD band when expected corporate default rates
rise. In a boom loans would be assigned to rating bands reflecting the borrower’s default
likelihood given the favourable economic conditions (not taking into account the possibility of
future recession) and then loans would be downgraded in recessions .This would be consistent
with Herring (1999) ‘disaster  myopia’ or the short-term profit focus in Rajan (1994).
In (2) the opposite would be the case – when expected corporate defaults are high banks would
assign loans to a lower PD band. In the model the PD band to which the borrower is assigned is
reflected in the interest rate charged. This scenario could be seen as banks charging what the
market will bear combined with issues arising from relationship banking. In good times the
borrowers are able to pay more and the banks can therefore place them in more conservative
rating bands. This would be consistent with Greenbaum et al (1989), Sharpe (1990) and Wilson
(1993), who argue that banks’ improved knowledge of a borrower, as the relationship continues,
enables banks to charge above cost interest rates. In recessions, the borrowers would be more
under pressure and, to avoid causing defaults, banks could soften lending terms by placing them
in less conservative rating bands.
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The final option (3) is clearly a very extreme version of forward-looking ratings. The rating
would be set according to the long-run average default rate for corporates. In practice even
forward-looking ratings would probably show some variation across the cycle.
These three types of rating process give different profiles of minimum capital:
(1) procyclical risk weights – which are higher in a recession;
(2) countercyclical risk weights – which are lower in a recession;
(3) constant risk weights over the cycle.
Constant (neutral) risk weights
We start with constant (neutral) risk weights as the benchmark case.
The capital adequacy ratio of a bank in this economy is defined by:
))1(( 21


bwrmw
ck


where c stands for shareholders’ funds available to meet the capital requirement, wi’s are the risk
weights that the regulator chooses for each band, and because loans remain in the same
probability of default band over the cycle this gives a constant risk weight for each asset, i=1,2,
m is the amount of credit extension from banks to the corporate sector, and b represents banks’
investment in the default-free asset markets. (Although the assets are assumed to be default free
there is always risk involved in their payoffs hence w2 has a value.) r is the loan interest rate.
The model was calibrated using 100% for  w1  and 25% for w2. 100% is risk weight for most
private sector loans under the current Accord and the Basel Committee has said that the new
Accord will be calibrated to deliver the same average risk weight giving an 8% capital charge.
25% is approximately the weight on high quality short-term securities issued by banks or
corporates held in a bank’s trading book.
Procyclical default-dependent risk weights
In this case, we replace the risk weight on loans to the corporate sector with w1*. This is equal to
the initial weight, w1, plus the linear term ( 2.04.0  n ),
2
)(   states  twoin the raterecovery  expected average  where 21

 nnn  ie it is set procyclically
w1*= f ( n ) with f’ < 0 (ie the risk weight increases as corporate default increases). The
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premium added to the risk weight w1 varies between –0.2 and +0.2 (ie a peak to trough variation
of 40%). This reflects the variation between peak and trough in the capital requirements of an
average G10 bank in Section 4, using ratings from a Merton-type model.
2
)(  states  twoin the
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)])1()2.0)(4.0([
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where )( 21
 nn  are the expected recovery rates of the corporate sector’s loans in state 1 (state 2).
Countercyclical default-dependent risk weights
Finally, by inverting the signs in our equation, we obtain a countercyclical policy. Loans move to
a higher PD rating category when current default decreases. Thus, the new risk weights are
assumed to increase with current repayments (ie the higher the amount of loans that are currently
expected to be repaid, the less will be expected to be paid in the future hence higher risk weights
are assigned to loans). More formally, w1*= f ( n ) with f’ > 0, as shown below.
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5.4  Comparative statics – evaluating the rating schemes
The comparative static experiments show that there is no ‘always-optimal’ (ie first-best) policy in
equilibrium. Basically, the preferred rating policy for a bank will change according to the specific
point in the economic cycle – ie the specific value of the trend component of the risk weights (ie
w1).  Since MECBD are constrained inefficient, given initial parameter values we can determine
the optimal rating scheme.  In particular, there is a trade-off between bank profitability and
welfare of the corporate sector because of the variability of default and the effect this has on
credit extension depending on the specific rating scheme.
In Chart 5 we show the equilibrium values for the different relevant variables (profits, welfare,
credit extension, asset investment, risk-weighted assets, total assets, and default levels) for the
procyclical and countercyclical rating regimes used by the banks. The charts in Chart 5 can be
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compared to those presented in Chart 4, for the neutral case. The aim of the experiment is to
highlight the changes in the variables, if any, under the three different rating regimes.
There are two variables where the differences between the three rating regimes are very
noticeable. We observe a bank portfolio substitution effect between credit extension and asset
investment (Chart 5b) but, interestingly, we observe that the countercyclical scheme reduces the
amplitude of the switch. This substitution effect occurs when the risk-weight on loans increases
relative to the one on default-free assets, encouraging banks to switch from making loans to
purchasing default-free assets. Thus the higher the weight on loans, the stronger is the switch
from loan investments to default-free assets. Under the countercyclical regime the allocation of
bank portfolios is more evenly balanced between default-free assets and loans.
In order to examine which rating scheme would be chosen by the banks it is necessary to consider
the effect of different schemes on bank profits and corporate sector default. To show the
differences under the three regimes Charts 6, 7 and 8 demonstrate how profits depend on default
for different values of w1 – ie different points in the economic cycle. These show that the
countercyclical or the procyclical rating schemes would be preferred to the neutral rating scheme
because profits are higher, more sensitive to changes in default levels.  Thus, in the optimal levels
banks prefer to restructure their portfolios using the counter or procyclical rating scheme.
Under a countercyclical rating scheme, banks will increase the risk weight on loans in booms
which will in turn lead to an increase in the interest rate paid by the corporate sector on loans.
This leads the corporate sector to reduce their borrowing, which reduces the default dispersion of
the corporate sector and increases bank expected profits.
In a recession, banks will reduce the risk weight on loans leading to a reduction in the interest
rate paid by the corporate sector on loans. This leads the corporate sector to borrow more than
would have been the case under other bank rating schemes. Default rises but remains below the
levels that would have been seen with other bank rating schemes. Under the countercyclical
rating scheme bank profits are, overall, higher across the cycle than they would be under either of
the other rating schemes. This is because banks benefit from higher interest payments in booms
and lower default rates in recessions. This is consistent with some theories of relationship
banking.
Under a procyclical rating scheme, banks will reduce the risk weight on loans in booms, leading
to increased borrowing which will result in increased default dispersion by the corporate sector
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but overall defaults are lower than in the countercyclical case (see Chart 5e). In recessions banks
will increase the risk weight and interest rates on loans leading the corporate sector to reduce
borrowing. Default rates are higher than in the countercyclical case. The procyclical regime
delivers profits which are less affected by default rates than under the countercyclical approach
but overall, across the cycle, bank profitability would be lower than under the countercyclical
scheme for ratings.
Under the neutral rating scheme the risk weights on loans would be invariant to the point in the
economic cycle. This regime would manifest monotonic behaviour in booms and in recessions
(Charts 7 and 8) but would not do so in the aggregate (Chart 6). During expansionary periods it
would resemble the countercyclical scheme and in recessions it would resemble the procyclical
scheme. Overall, it would deliver lower bank profits than either the countercyclical or the
procyclical schemes.
In the calibration of the model which has been used (with w1 = 100% and w2 = 25%) the total
profit of the bank would be ½% lower under the neutral rather than the countercyclical or
procyclical ratings approach, with countercyclical delivering slightly higher profit than
procyclical. This may seem a relatively small difference but it translates into a sizable amount for
a large bank – £35 million per annum for a £7 billion profit bank.
These results show that given freedom to choose any rating scheme, banks would tend to opt for a
countercyclical approach. Some bankers are arguing for a countercyclical approach to capital
requirements. Ervin and Wilde (2001) suggest that regulators could let the aggregate amount of
capital in the system float with the cycle. Banks would be judged relative to an overall
benchmark rather than an absolute level. Regulators would require less capital when this was
necessitated by economic circumstances – ie when perceived risk is higher. Taylor (2002) also
suggests that capital requirements should be anti-cyclical.
However, a countercyclical approach would cut across the objectives of the new Accord, which is
to deliver more capital when risks rise, making it unlikely that the Committee or any supervisors
would be willing to adopt this approach.
This will leave the banks with a choice of ratings which are (1) designed to be less likely to vary
as economic conditions change or (2) are procyclical demonstrating more downgrades in
recessions. The first could be achieved by taking into account the possibility of future economic
downturns when credit is extended in booms so that capital is built up earlier and then is
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sufficient, or at least less likely to have to increase sharply, in recessions. Ratings based on
current economic conditions would be an example of the second approach. In recessions banks
would face the need for substantial increases in minimum capital requirements. Alternatively as
Ervin and Wilde point out if a bank wished to avoid pressure on its capital ratios it could stop
lending or sell assets leading to a significant impact on overall credit markets.
The model suggests that, given this choice, the banks will opt for procyclical ratings because this
would lead to higher profits than a rating approach which delivered more stability over the cycle.
Under the procyclical approach, banks would extend more loans in booms than under the neutral
approach (this can clearly be seen from Chart 5b relative to Chart 4b) and would charge a lower
rate of interest. The greater extension of credit leads to higher default rates (see Chart 5e relative
to Chart 4e) but overall because of the much greater volume of loans bank profitability in booms
would be higher under the procyclical than under the neutral rating approach. In recessions banks
using the procyclical rating approach would charge higher interest rates than banks using the
neutral approach and extend less credit causing more corporate defaults (see Chart 5f relative to
Chart 4f). Profitability would be lower in recessions under the procyclical approach than under
the neutral but across the whole cycle the reverse would be true. The higher profits in booms
outweigh the lower profits in recessions giving banks with the procyclical rating approach higher
overall profitability than banks with neutral ratings. This indicates that banks which follow a
procyclical approach to ratings will tend to exacerbate overlending in booms, and contractions in
recessions.
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Chart 4: Evolution of main endogenous variables as loans risk weight (W1) changes
All charts show the neutral risk weight regime
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Procyclical and countercyclical schemes
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Chart 6: Expected total default and profits attainable under every regulation regime.
Polynomial trend line for all experiments.
Chart 7: Total default in the bad state and profits attainable under every regulatory
regime. Polynomial trend line for all experiments.
Chart 8: Total default in the good state and profits attainable under every regulatory
regime. Polynomial trend line for all experiments.
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5.5  Welfare effects of the choice in ratings
Thus banks, given the choice of rating scheme, would opt for a countercyclical regime, or if
prevented from doing so would opt for a procyclical regime as a second best. However, to
maximise welfare or minimise default, the neutral, regime would be preferable. This is because
under a procyclical or countercyclical regime the change in weights allows banks to transfer the
dead-weight loss due to default to the corporate sector and households. The change in weights
would be reflected in changes in investment rates and changes in borrower behaviour. The
procyclical and countercyclical schemes lead banks to restructure their portfolio quickly when
economic conditions change. By transferring the negative impact of a recession to the rest of the
economy, banks can reduce the effect on their profits.
Table 10:  Best performing policy when banks choose the risk weights
Best regime in terms
of
MAXIMISING PROFITS
is…
Best regime in terms
of
MAXIMISING
WELFARE
is…
Best regime in terms of
MINIMISING  DEFAULT
is…
IF THE BANKS
CHOOSE THE RISK
WEIGHTS…
Countercyclical weights Constant weights Constant weights
The constant risk weights could reflect the relative riskiness of different loans over the long term.
The model has not explored the welfare costs of constant risk weights for private sector loans
which did not reflect relative riskiness (as in Basel I). These effects could be severe.
5.6  Effect on bank capital
Banks currently maintain capital in excess of the regulatory minimum probably because of
market pressure to achieve a particular external rating (see Jackson, Perraudin and Saporta
(2002)). An important question therefore is whether banks which adopt the more procyclical
rating approach would in turn simply build up a larger excess over the regulatory minimum in
booms to enable the minimum capital constraint to be met in recessions without reducing bank
lending. This would, however, be tantamount to adopting the neutral loan rating scheme which
the model indicates they would not choose. Under the neutral regime they in effect build up a
capital buffer in the boom to reflect the deterioration which will occur in the recession but do so
through their rating scheme rather than using an excess.
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6    Forward-looking ratings
The likelihood that banks, given a choice of procyclical ratings or more neutral ratings, would
choose the former resulting in welfare costs, points to the need for the supervisors to consider
mechanisms which would provide incentives to the banks to adopt a more forward-looking
approach. It is unlikely that the banks could develop an approach that was completely neutral
across different economic conditions, as in the model set out above. Borio, Furfine and Lowe
(2001) highlight the need for supervisors to consider rules which promote better measurement of
the time dimension of risk, such as longer horizons for risk measurement, the use of stress testing
and forward-looking provisioning. Haldane, Hoggarth and Saporta (2001) suggest that it would
be preferable if bank risk assessments attempted to take into account the economic cycle as a
whole. This would not mean forecasting the path of the cycle but assessing the effect of an
adverse change in the economic environment on a borrower’s creditworthiness when extending
credit. Crockett (2000) points out that, although risks usually materialise in recessions, the actual
increase in risk would have occurred in the previous upswing. This should be reflected in the
banks’ capital requirements.  It has also been suggested that a solution might be for banks to
estimate probabilities of default for borrowers over the life of a loan but this estimate too could
be conditioned on the state of the cycle.
The latest Basel II proposals set out by the Basel Committee included a number of changes to
encourage banks to use more forward-looking ratings. A borrower’s rating must represent the
bank’s assessment of the borrower’s ability and willingness to meet commitments despite adverse
economic conditions or the occurrence of unexpected events. In addition, banks must stress test
their capital requirements to assess how they may change in a recession.
7    Conclusion
The proposed new Basel Accord, in contrast to the Current Accord, makes provision for time
varying risk weights for individual loans. Although the Basel Committee will set fixed weights
for loans with a given probability of borrower default, banks will choose the probability of
default band into which a loan will be slotted. It then becomes very important how the banks
carry out this ‘slotting’. When banks assess a borrower’s probability of default the assessment
can be based on current economic conditions (where the rating will be conditioned on the point in
the cycle) or can take into account the effect on the borrower of a possible adverse change in the
climate.  Taking rating agency ratings as an example of the latter approach, it emerges that even
this approach could lead to a 15% increase in bank capital requirements in a recession. Much of
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this reflects defaults rather than the deterioration in quality of non-defaulted assets.  The new
element under Basel II is the additional procyclicality which will come from the latter element.
A rating approach conditioned on the economic conditions prevailing when the loan was made
could lead to a much greater increase in capital requirements on non-defaulted assets.  This would
be more akin to the results from a Merton-type credit risk model, using the current equity price
and importantly current balance sheet data to calculate the likely default probability for the
borrower under an options pricing methodology. These results show that under a Merton
approach capital requirements could increase by as much as 50% for high quality banks in a
recession.
Strongly procyclical capital requirements could cause severe macro economic effects by creating
credit crunches in recessions, thereby exacerbating the economic downturn. They could also
encourage excessive lending in booms. An important policy issue is therefore whether banks
would choose to adopt more stable ratings across the cycle, which would moderate the
procyclical effects, or whether they would adopt ratings conditioned on the point in the cycle
even though this could lead to an inability to meet demands for credit in a downturn. The general
equilibrium approach used in this paper strongly indicates that banks will not choose a more
stable approach. Given complete freedom they would choose a countercyclical approach,
reducing ratings in a recession and if regulators prevent this (as they are almost certain to do
under the new Basel Accord) banks will adopt a procyclical approach.
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Annex 1
Table A: KVM one-year transition matrix based on non-overlapping EDF ranges
Rating at year-end (%)Initial
Rating
AAA AA A BBB B B CCC Default
AAA 66.26 22.22 7.37 2.45 0.86 0.67 0.14 0.02
AA 21.66 43.04 25.83 6.56 1.99 0.68 0.20 0.04
A 2.76 20.34 44.19 22.94 7.42 1.97 0.28 0.10
BBB 0.30 2.80 22.63 42.54 23.52 6.95 1.00 0.26
BB 0.08 0.24 3.69 22.93 44.41 24.53 3.41 0.71
B 0.01 0.05 0.39 3.48 20.47 53.00 20.58 2.01
CCC 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.26 1.79 17.77 69.94 10.13
Source:  KMV Corporation
Table B:  Transition matrix based on actual rating changes
Rating at year-end (%)Initial
Rating
AAA AA A BBB B B CCC Default
AAA 90.81 8.33 0.68 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA 0.70 90.65 7.79 0.64 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.00
A 0.09 2.27 91.05 5.52 0.74 0.26 0.01 0.06
BBB 0.02 0.33 5.95 86.93 5.30 1.17 0.12 0.18
BB 0.03 0.14 0.67 7.73 80.53 8.84 1.00 1.06
B 0.00 0.11 0.24 0.43 6.48 83.46 4.07 5.20
CCC 0.22 0.00 0.22 1.30 2.38 11.24 64.86 19.79
Source:  Standard & Poor’s CreditWeek, April 15 1996
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Table C:  Transition matrices derived from ordered profit models based on Moody’s
ratings between 31.12.70 and 31.12.97 reported in Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto ‘Stability
of ratings transactions’ (May 2001)
United States: Industrial
Business cycle trough
Terminal Rating
Initial
rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa C/Ca Def
Aaa 89.0 10.0 0.9 - - - - - -
Aa 0.6 87.8 10.9 0.5 0.1 - - - -
A 0.1 2.3 92.4 4.7 0.4 0.1 - - -
Baa - 0.2 4.6 89.5 4.8 0.7 0.1 - 0.1
Ba - - 0.2 3.5 85.7 8.5 0.3 - 1.8
B - - 0.2 0.5 5.7 83.5 2.1 0.5 7.5
Caa - - - - 2.2 7.5 68.1 3.9 18.3
Ca/C - - - - - 3.9 13.1 61.8 21.2
Business cycle peak
Table D:  All ratings
Business cycle trough
Terminal rating
Initial
rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa C/Ca Def
No. of
Issuer
Years
Aaa 89.6 10.0 0.4 - - - - - - 930
Aa 0.9 88.3 10.7 0.1 0.0 - - - - 2195
A 0.1 2.7 91.1 5.6 0.4 0.0 - - 0.0 4591
Baa 0.0 0.3 6.6 86.8 5.6 0.4 0.2 - 0.1 3656
Ba - 0.1 0.5 5.9 83.1 8.4 0.3 0.0 1.7 2715
B - 0.1 0.2 0.8 6.6 79.6 2.2 1.0 9.4 1459
Caa - - - 0.9 1.9 9.3 63.0 1.9 23.1 108
Ca/C - - - - - 5.9 5.9 64.7 23.5 34
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Table E:  Transition matrix generated using Moody’s data 1990 to 1992
1990-2
% AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC/C Def
AAA 81.41 18.27 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA 0.61 84.79 14.36 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A 0.00 0.59 92.89 6.19 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB 0.00 0.14 3.97 88.39 6.80 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.14
BB 0.00 0.00 0.16 5.59 82.45 8.39 0.31 0.00 3.11
B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 9.22 73.16 3.28 0.61 13.11
CCC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.00 4.00 36.00 12.00 40.00
Table F: Transition matrix for ratings generated using Merton model
                1990 to 1992
% AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC/C Def
AAA 88.08 5.30 3.97 1.32 0.66 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA 41.30 17.39 19.57 8.70 8.70 4.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
A 0.00 5.00 25.00 35.00 30.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB 11.11 7.41 7.41 7.41 44.44 22.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
BB 18.18 9.09 13.64 9.09 9.09 40.91 0.00 0.00 0.00
B 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 50.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
CCC 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 40.00 10.00 0.00 0.00
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Table G:  Transition matrices generated using Merton model
1989-90
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC-C Def
AAA 66.37 17.49 7.62 7.17 0.90 0.45 0.00 0.00
AA 10.34 24.14 10.34 20.69 34.48 0.00 0.00 0.00
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 66.67 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BB 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.33 33.33 33.33 25.00 0.00
B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 80.00 0.00
CCC-C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
1990-1
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC-C Def
AAA 94.04 4.64 1.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA 50.00 32.61 6.52 8.70 0.00 2.17 0.00 0.00
A 0.00 35.00 30.00 35.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB 3.70 22.22 14.81 37.04 22.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
BB 0.00 22.73 4.55 18.18 50.00 4.55 0.00 0.00
B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 66.67 33.33 0.00 0.00
CCC-C 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 20.00 60.00 0.00
1991-2
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC-C Def
AAA 87.95 6.02 4.22 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.00
AA 27.50 20.00 22.50 22.50 7.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
A 6.25 6.25 37.50 18.75 31.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB 3.85 11.54 7.69 11.54 46.15 19.23 0.00 0.00
BB 0.00 0.00 4.55 9.09 27.27 54.55 4.55 0.00
B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 66.67 0.00 0.00
CCC-C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00
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Annex 2
Endowments (monetary and commodities) for the three sectors of the economy
      States
Sectors
t = 0 T =1S = 1
t =1
s = 2
e 9 0 0
m 0.05 0 0
e 0 6 2
m 0 0.9 0.02
Note: Time = {0,1}, States = {1,2}, Households ={}, Corporate Sector = {}
           Banks = {} Commodities = {1}
Where e (m) are the commodity (monetary) endowments of the various sectors
In addition:
A= [1 0]T   ,  asset payoffs
∆MG=0.2   ,  monetary supply
K=0.04      ,  capital ratio
L1=0.74     ,  default penalty 1
L2=0.95     ,  default penalty 2
cγ=0.035    ,  shareholders’ fund
W2 =1        , risk weight of bank financial assets
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Annex 3
Optimisation problems for each agent
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  COMMERCIAL BANKS
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Balance sheet of the banking sector
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E
-  SHAREHOLDERS’
   FUNDS
50
Annex 4
Market clearing conditions of the existing six markets
               Commodity Markets
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                  Central Bank Market Operations
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
 ; (1+ interest rate) =
    Loan Market

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m
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b
; (1+loan interest rate) =
               Asset Market
bq
b 
 ; asset price =
money bid by the corporate sector
                supply of goods
money bid by the household in s=1
                supply of goods
money bid by the household in s=2
              supply of goods
I.O.U. notes by commercial banks
          supply of base money
I.O.U. notes by the corporate sector
               credit extension
money bid by banks
      asset supply
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Annex 5
Best performing regulatory policy under different policy objectives
1. Policy objective: MAXIMISE TOTAL EXPECTED PROFITS
For each policy, w1 is chosen so that we obtain the maximum bank’s total profits. Thus, the regulator will choose:
w1 = 0.95 with a procyclical and countercyclical regimes
w1 = 1 with a constant regime
According to this:
Assets sold
by corporate
sector
Loan’s demand
By corporate
sector
Assets purchased
by bank
Loan’s extension
By bank
Repayment rate
corporate sector,
good st.
Repayment rate
corporate sector,
bad st.
BEST PERFORMING REGULATORY POLICY (qb) (mub) (bg) (mg) (n1
b) (n2b)
Criteria Highest level Highest level highest level Highest level highest level highest level
Best Policy CONSTANT COUNTERCY. CONSTANT COUNTERCY. COUNTERCY. CONSTANT
Bank profits Bank profits Bank Profits Corporate sector’s S1,  Corporate sector’s S2,  Corporate sector’s S1,  Corporatesector’s
S2,  Corporate
sector’s Corporate sector’s
Good st (S1) Bad st (S2) TOTAL Utility Default rate (%) Default rate (%) total default (£) total default (£) total default (£)
(S1 + S2) (Ub) (1-n1b) (1-n2b) (D1b)  (D2b) State 1 + 2
Criteria highest level Highest level Highest level Highest level lowest level Lowest level lowest level lowest level lowest level
Best Policy COUNTERCY. CONSTANT COUNTERCY. CONSTANT COUNTERCY. CONSTANT COUNTERCY. CONSTANT CONSTANT
 VARIABLES NOT LISTED IN THE TABLE DID NOT CHANGE DURING THE COMPARATIVE STATICS EXPERIMENT.
